The traditional sources of international law are frequently attacked as being too narrow, backward-looking, and at any rate, incapable of coping with the modem problems of international relations.** As a result, due to the expansion of communication amongst states and the proliferation of international organizations, new candidates for international law sources are being tendered. In a world that, according to Wolfgang Friedmann, is moving from coexistence to cooperation and even to forms of integration, 1 it is alleged that treaties, custom, and general principles of law no longer suffice to fully shed light on processes of norm creation in the international community. 
The framers of the Statute clearly intended to codify the generally accepted rules of international law pertaining to sources prevailing at the time. They worked on the assumption that the sources enumerated in Article 38 represented the totality of applicable norm categories. Despite the fact that the old European balance of power had foundered on the rocks of World War I, there clearly remained widespread acceptance of these basic rules on the sources of international law in their Eurocentric orientation.
Article 38(lXc) of the Court's Statute reflects this by referring to 'civilized nations', a term that applied to the European powers and that might have been hairraising if invented after World War II, but was readily accepted in 1920 as part of a compromise in exchange for the recognition of the category of general principles as a formula to bridge positivist and natural law controversies. Although stales by no means wished to subscribe to idealistic norm conceptions,full of cultural, political, economic and social differences. Rules of international law therefore, needed to have very strong underpinnings to be acceptable to all. The vast increase in treaty law after 1945 is not only due to the increased number of states, but as a trend also reflects the inherent lack of faith of new states, which preferred to subscribe to international law rules only if they had played a part in their formulation.
On the other hand, when those new states discovered that political independence did not automatically entail full socio-economic freedom, and that development strategies were needed to bring about the equality of states promised in the UN Charter, and when they subsequently saw that political strategies for overcoming underdevelopment hardly changed their predicament, the norm-creating process of international law was rediscovered, and imbued with new meaning. 12 In many international organizations attempts were made by overwhelming majorities to upgrade resolutions and declarations to quasi-legislative acts of those bodies, binding upon member states. And as nearly all states were members of the UN, these norm formulations of international organizations were proposed as a new source of international law. In their reactions to this development many authors took the trouble at least to distinguish between those resolutions/declarations which were merely directed at the internal functioning of the organizational organs, and those which served as organizational decisions, recommendations or goal formulations without the intention of having a directly binding legal effect Others categorized these utterances as constituting evidence of state practice in general; or of organizational practice with relevance to international law; or as evidence of a general opinio iuris sive necessitous; or even as 'pressure-cooked' instant customary law 13 in those spheres where there was an urgent social need for legal regulation and, consequently, no time for the gradual formation of state practice.
But even those who did not participate in that fierce debate had to acknowledge that the work of the World Organization did have a profound effect on the actual behaviour of states: they no longer could act as they pleased -not even the superpowers -but instead had to reckon with the communis opinio enunciated by the General Assembly of the UN and by other international fora. They could, of course, ignore the approval or disapproval by those fora of world public opinion, but such an attitude greatly interfered with the political manoeuvring space left to them. States, on the whole, have learned that breaking elementary rules of international law entails being ostracized at the UN, and while undoubtedly it can be maintained for some time, such defiance tends to be very costly in the end, as the Union of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Saddam Hussein of Iraq have had to find out. In any event, the period from 1943 to this day has seen the affirmation of old and the production of new general principles, not just of law, but specifically of international law; foremost amongst them the so-called UN Charter principles laid down in Articles 1 and 2, which Georg Schwarzenberger 14 once called the pillars upon which the world organization rests, such as sovereignty, equality of states, non-intervention, renunciation of the threat or use of force as a means of dispute settlement, to name but some of those fundamental principles that have no direct counterparts at the national leveL They are general principles sui generis, and yet no one would deny their legal relevance, either as world constitutional principles, or simply as treaty obligations under the UN Charter, or as generalizations of rules of customary international law.
Since most of these newer principles relate to political activities of states acting as members of the UN and of its specialized agencies, it matters little whether or not they fall into one of the traditional sources marked out for the ICJ.
These developments taken together -distrust of the ICJ by the Third World; distrust of the quasi-legislative activities of UN bodies by Western states; rejection of any extension of traditional sources if it meant giving up one's own fundamental views about legal norms, together with the greater political significance of international organizations -made it abundantly clear that alongside the traditional sources of international law new methods for formulating norms were developed that simply did not fit naturally into the sources triad of the World Court Regarding them as subsidiary sources within the meaning of Article 38(l)(d) of the ICJ Statute, although also tried, did not work either. These norm formulations cannot be regarded as auxiliary evidence of international law like judicial pronouncements or 'teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations', geared to interpret treaties, custom or general principles of law, because they may have their own distinct role to play. In fact, some resolutions, declarations, or codes of conduct can be subsidiary sources in the sense described. Their content is declaratory of treaties, custom or general principles. If, however, they are constitutive of new norms of international law, they do not fit into this picture. As Alfred Verdross and Bruno Simma cogently pointed out, contrary to national law, international law does not know a numerus clausus of modes of law creation. 15 Christian Tomuschat summarized this as follows:
(The traditional categorization of sources) merely describes the external forms to which the legal win of the community of states so far has been limited. These formalities are merely indicators foT the existence of a genuine legal will which at any time can take on a completely different appearance. 16 Or, as Verdross and Simma put it: 'Norm creation thus is not limited to particular kinds of sources but finds itself in a state of liquid aggregation', 17 whereby states rather than purely relying on Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute utilize more direct means of norm creation, by means of recognition, toleration, simple acceptance, the dispute of claims and situations, in a 'process of continuous interaction, of continuous demand and response'.
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Thus far, most writers on international law will agree. All will concede that something new has emerged from within the UN, but great dissent exists as to the categorization of these new politico-legal phenomena. To assess the impact of these new phenomena, a word needs to be said about the interrelation of international law and international relations. 19 While the discipline of international law is concerned with the normative framework of the international community as a legal order, the discipline of international relations analyses the modes of action and the practice of actors in a political context. A juxtaposition of these scientific disciplines, irrespective of marked differences of approaches, suffers from a fundamental flaw: Norms do not merely belong to the realm of oughtness but may also be analysed as facts. Traditional international lawyers of the positivist school tried to reduce legal discourse to the pure discussion of relations between norms and questions of legal validity, to a pure exercise in systematization of ought-propositions by means of syllogistic analysis.
20 By contrast, a wider conception of law will embrace relevant factual bases of norms as an empirical basis of a social and political nature, thereby taking into purview the reality of the international community. Factual parameters will thus also be assessed in a normative context, so that state practice can be ana- lysed by international law categories, even if the practice does not amount to legal but rather to political or ethical norms of action. This broader conception of the reach of international law, transcending pure 'ought-analysis', has much to recommend itself, for when one looks at the international legal process one finds that the stage of final decisions binding upon the parties concerned is reached only in a very few isolated instances. Usually the application of the law stops far short of that and remains at the stage of more or less divergent individual self-assessments of rights and duties under international law. 21 Recent demonstrations in point are the Afghanistan and Grenada interventions, or the bombardment of Libyan targets in the Gulf of Libya by the United States.
It is suggested here that some of the newer policy parameters of international relations can best be labelled 'standards'. But before these standards are examined more closely, a little more needs to be said about normative varieties of international law, and their actual relationship with the factual bases of international relations. 23 Both spheres are strictly delineated, and the lawyer is only entitled to analyse 'laws properly so-called'. This distinction is not, however, meant here. Instead, the characterization of hard and soft law is merely intended to focus attention on the fact that on the one hand some state obligations are created by treaties binding states objectively or benefiting individuals as subjective rights, as is the case with human rights norms (clearly designed as rules of hard law), while on the other hand, there exist a whole range of international rules which are derived from legally non-binding instruments but undoubtedly express normative claims, such as norms of imperfect obligation. An example of a norm of this category is furnished by international prescription of a right to work. Such a right is even accepted by Western states that generally feel unable to accord it the same status as civil and political rights, owing to the fear that they might not be able to fulfil such rights in times of economic difficulties unless one opted for a model of socialist planned economy. The merits of that argument will not be pursued here.
II. Norm Varieties in International Law
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Suffice it to say that norms such as the right to work can nevertheless be accepted as representing norms of imperfect obligation, yardsticks or standards, meant to serve as incentives at the national level. Such standards are parameters which are brought to bear upon the national legal order and which may be -but need not necessarily be -applied fully in the decision-making process of legislative, executive, or judicial bodies, unless these standards are turned into a hard obligation by means of domestic law. More will be said about these standards shortly.
Apart from these standards, other types of transpositive norm programmes exist, such as those formulating promotional obligations. 24 These obligations which amount to outlining specific promotional activities such as seminars, expert-meetings, educational programmes and providing general public relations measures, are placed on states ratifying respective treaties, in the hope of attracting attention to particular norm programmes. Resort to standards is meant to arouse awareness for economic, social, and cultural rights and to create stronger internal pressure which will supplement a relatively weak international pressure, in the hope that this will ultimately induce legislative or executive agencies to translate these norm programmes into binding rules of national law.
Another type of norm visualizing goals or aims considered desirable, may be described as norms of aspiration. These serve as pointers or landmarks for the direction of programmatic aims in longer-term projection and often stress the necessity of stronger respect for human rights in finding solutions to economic or social questions.
Transpositive norm programmes also include norms which do not properly belong to the legal sphere, but are rooted in religious, natural law, anthropological, contractualist or consent-based concepts. Although they may look like legal norms, they are derived from different sources. Amidst these extra-legal norms we also find norms of non-legal societal influence, such as recognized usages and practices of states, which fall short of legal norms and often have no other basis than psychological and sociological preferences or simply usages or habits of obedience. Yet, nonlegal as these norms may be, they often influence state behaviour as if non-compliance with such usage or practice might actually entail sanctions. In a descending order of obligation such norm programmes become less and less law-like.
While it is thus possible to distinguish these various types of norm categories found in international law, the intrinsic value of the differentiation becomes evident when one looks at the practice of states in those areas of the law where the proper consent basis is slender, and yet the need for concerted international action is felt strongly, as seen for example, in the Helsinki process of the CSCE. 26 Undoubtedly, cation. Thus, the concrete case decision will be borne by the 'hard law' elements of the combination standard, while the non-binding elements of the standard serve as propositions of reasoning, bolstering up the often slender hard law foundation of the decision. Ultimately, the coalition or co-existence of norms of varying degrees of normative 'density' should not be seen as a sign of the primitive nature of international law, but rather of its maturity, since it was able to develop an adequate and realistic array of cooperative instruments where effective sanctions are lacking. In this combination role, programmatic norms can also fulfil harmonization and multiplication functions. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948, while clearly non-binding as a declaration of the UN General Assembly, has been incorporated in many constitutions of newly-independent states, and has served as an aspiration model for the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as for other Human Rights documents. 31 Aspiration norms can also be found in the UDHR: it recognized the right to own property, which was later dropped from the UN Covenant of Civil and Political Rights owing to dissent about the extent of limitations, not of substance as such. 32 Today, the UDHR is universally recognized as a high-ranking document of political and ethical value, containing norms of aspiration which in many ways can become the crystallization point for future legal developments at both the national constitutional level and the international level, as the numerous examples of domestic and international codification illustrate.
As an extra-legal or non-legal ethical construct contained within existing international normative programmes, the right to own property, for instance, has only limited significance. However, it can still serve, for instance, to legitimize the concept of 'smaller ownership', i.e. property rights limited to subsistence guarantees of individuals, but it could not be utilized as a justification for large-scale capital accumulation. At this point it becomes quite clear that by this usage of a norm, the existing ideological barriers between various world regions may, in fact, have a destabilizing effect on human rights realization. All that remains to be done in such a situation is to climb down the ladder of norms of international law from the universal to the regional or even to the sub-regional level where more homogeneous conceptions about the contents of these norms may exist 33 In the West European framework, the fundamental character of the property guarantee may thus serve as an additional argument when determining the common legal convictions of all member states of the Council of Europe about the need for protecting property.
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These few illustrations may suffice to demonstrate the utility of employing combination standards in international law, particularly in those areas of international law where hard law rules do not abound, but where, as in environmental law, or economic, social, and cultural human rights law, the need for conceited action is evident to all. In these areas, political scientists, sociologists, and scientists of related disciplines generally shy away from norm analyses, and when international lawyers restrict their norm analysis to classical 'hard law' formulations, a gap is left that should definitely be bridged. For this practical reason alone, such inchoate norms should be regarded as an integral part of international law, not just as part of the discipline of international relations. For the focus of that discipline will generally be on mechanisms of interaction of political systems and of political actors, thereby belittling the factual importance of the legal standards outlined.
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If one looks at another social human right, the right to work, one finds that its universal acceptance in the UDHR and in Article 6 of the UN Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of 1966 has been underpinned and concretized by more than 100 ILO conventions. 36 And these conventions openly utilize the 'standard-setting' procedures, whereby universal norm formulation is joined with national law modes of implementation and regular references and controls in ILO expert fora. 37 
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this approach is the reference to the average conduct of a reasonable man, which must be complied with in order to avoid liability. 42 Josef Esser cogently rooted these standards in common sense, and in the conduct of typical, normal social intercourse. 43 Marcel Stati has named this standard-type behaviour, type moyen de conduke soaale correct*** factually assessing types of conduct, then charging that conduct normadvely and thus raising it to the level of a legal norm. Another example of that type of standard is the duty of care which a reasonable man owes: This 'reasonable man' is not only reasonable but also prudent, fair, careful, meticulous, and weighs alternatives sensibly before acting.
That 'man on the Clapham omnibus' 43 is neither particularly anxious, nor fearful, nor excessively happy-go-lucky, yet he is not a 'paragon of circumspection', as Lord Reid once put it, 46 but a man on the street who at home reads newspapers and mows the lawn with his sleeves'rolled up. Roscoe Pound in his famous Yale lectures of 1923 has outlined the importance of standards in judicial law-making and in a few words managed to differentiate standards from other legal terms. 47 First, he renounced rigid system thinking: clear-cut, simple legal rules, built up to create a closed legal system, in his view, could only be regarded as sufficient in primitive societies of limited cultural development To impose such a one-dimensional legal network on the modem state, as legal positivism would have us do, would be highly misleading. As soon as differentiations of societal organization become visible, more general principles of judicial and dogmatic arguments would develop alongside legal rules or norms stricto sensu. Later still, the terminological spectrum would be broadened further to embrace legal ideas and conceptions, and parallel to it, legal standards of conduct Pound and Esser contrasted standards with legal principles. Both terms have in common that they operate on a higher level of abstraction than concrete legal rules. The main difference between principles and standards according to this view is that principles rest in themselves and do not name specific yardsticks of conduct, while standards describe a yardstick that has to be filled out by judicial discretion with in vivo acquired views concerning values, duties, and care considera-tions. 48 The legal standard, conceived as a rule of judicial discretion, as an aid for case by case reasoning, covers such notions as good faith, fair behaviour of trustees, reasonable and conscientious conduct of the 'reasonable, prudent man', in short, yardsticks of normality for factual social conduct Pound then charges these standards with other structural components: (1) criteria like fairness, care, adequacy or conscientiousness always embrace a moral dimension: (2) furthermore, all standards pick up criteria of practical reason, experience, or intuition: they must all stand the test of 'common sense*, 'trained intuition', or practice; and finally; (3), Pound declares openness of standards to be of primary importance. As opposed to the closed, static unchangeable principle -or indeed the legal rule -the standard proves to be a flexible, 'open' instrument for the concretization of legal norms for application in individual cases. Pound then analyses the 'social engineers' operating these standards, and has much to say about this which could be utilized for the theory of international relations, but this argument cannot be pursued here. absence of specific legal norms to the contrary, must of necessity be applied without further ado. Another set of standards found in common law thinking may be defined as 'Metastandards'. In this function standards govern the interplay of legal rules, principles, and individual standards. Additionally, they may serve as evaluation yardsticks when a particular canon of interpretation is sought 52 Meta-standards will be consulted in various circumstances for fundamental questions of any legal order, for example, whether, how, and to what extent Parliament can bind future parliaments, or what weight should be given to interpretation maxims in practice. Meta-standards also address the question as to the placement that should be assigned to general clauses with a high degree of abstraction, or to public policy exceptions, and how the ratio decidendi should be distilled from precedents. If these standards are considered as extra-legal, their application depends on a discretionary determination by the decision-maker, usually a judge, who may utilize standards as reasoning sets to be incorporated into the line of arguments justifying a particular decision. Since any legal operation involves value judgments concerning whether an 'is' proposition should be aligned with an 'ought' proposition, there is ample application for standards, and it matters little whether for doctrinal reasons they are applied from the inside or outside of the legal structure. There is good reason to place them within the system, if the concept of law is broadened. Standards will always relate to yardsticks of practical reason, of average social conduct, thus mustering much practical support
B. Standards in the German 'Topics' Debate
In this context only few parameters of an involved philosophical discussion will be mentioned. 53 The German debate starts from the premise that there is no room for standards where clear-cut norms and simple factual norm bases exist Only where doubt and controversy rages about the actual norm contents or where there are gaps in the law, where 'problem thinking' begins, can standards play a useful role. Thus, problem thinking is the common feature of 'topics' and standards.
Problem thinking usually arises in three distinct situations. First, in the search for premises, i.e. for pre-judgments, finding a rational foundation for discussion paving the way for subsequent decisions. The actual decision is not part of that process of deliberation. Secondly, Topics discussion also tries to elucidate the premises for decision-making by analysing individual topoi, relevant aspects. The aim of this Thus, the Topics school of thought adheres to a certain sense of professionalism and as only competent persons are allowed to join in the debate, consent tends to be found more easily than amongst laymen. Topoi by their nature create parameters for comparison, avoiding categorical classification. Reasoning thus is comparative, not axiomatic-deductive. In the third situation Topics focuses on the application of these parameters. As a theory of reasoning, 55 it embraces all relevant considerations and leaves decisions to be controlled by the development of discussion.
Critics of the problems approach, while not denying some usefulness for that theory, mainly attack its claim of exclusiveness which, they argue, leaves too minor a role to traditional dogmatics, jurisprudence of the courts, interpretation and application of legislation. Critics will also point out that no precise definition of topical discussion is offered, and that the relevance of arguments should rest entirely on the value of reasoning as such. Consent reached would be dispositive and thus open to frequent change. Topoi would, therefore, be unsuitable as delimiting and legitimizing criteria. Seen, however, as methodology, as preparatory tools for the development of plausibility strategies, topics discussion would appear to constitute a useful addition to the deductive legal system-thinking. In stressing the essential openness of topoi. Topics may reflect the dynamic components of law, in contrast to static definitions of law. 
Another advantage of Topics is its capacity to mediate between fixed definitions
C. Standards in International Law
As can be expected, the many-faceted discussion about legal standards has ramifications at the international law level as well. The terminology employed is, however, much looser. Frequently, standards figure only as synonyms for fully binding norms of international law, such as rules or general principles of law, and are invoked usually only when the policy aspects of these norms are discussed, i.e., their programmatic steering functions. This undifferentiated terminology will be discarded in the ensuing remarks, since it blurs the distinct relevance of standards. In state practice, quite a number of specific standards have been developed in very different fields of international law, in particular in international economic law, international labour law, environment law and human rights law. Close analysis reveals that no sphere of international law is immune from such standard-thinking and reasoning. 65 Thus, in environmental law, where the need to quickly generate new obligations, preventive measures, and duties of cooperation is most obvious, 66 
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